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Resolving  Debt Crises:  An Historical  Perspective 
Abstract 
Two general  approaches  have  been offered  for dealing  with  the 
developing  country  debt crisis:  continued  reliance on case—by—case 
negotiation,  versus  global  plans  for  fundamentally  restructuring  the terms 
of  international  lending  and repayment.  Both  approaches  have precedents  in 
earlier  historical  periods.  In  the  1930s,  for  instance,  when some two 
thirds of foreign  dollar  bonds  lapsed  into default,  several  global  schemes 
for resolving  the crisis  were considered  even  while  individual  debtor— 
creditor  negotiations  were  underway.  In  the end no global  plan  was adopted 
and the debt crisis  of the  30s was resolved  by the muddling—through 
approach  of case—by—case  negotiation.  This experience  suggests  two 
questions  about  the efficacy  of the alternative  approaches.  First,  what 
stumbling  blocks  stand  in the way of the adoption  of  global  schemes? 
Second,  as a crisis  drags  on, how do the  evolution  of debtor  and 
creditor  strategies  permit it  tø be resolved through  bilateral  negotiation? 
In this paper  historical  evidence from the interwar  period  is addressed  to 
these  questions. 
Barry  Eichengreen 
Department  of Economics 
University  of California 
Berkeley,  California  94720 The developing—country  debt crisis  recently celebrated  its fifth 
anniversary.  That more than five years have passed  since the  Mexican 
crisis  of 1982 is no cause for celebration.  In the intervening  years, the 
collapse of long—term lending and the policies of austerity adopted by the 
borrowers have combined  with global economic imbalances  to depress 
domestic investment  and economic growth through  much of the developing 
world.  As the crisis drags  on,  prospects for renewed growth  continue to 
be adversely affected.  This recognition  has occasioned  a number of 
ambitious plans for resolving  the crisis.  These range from the Baker Plan 
to encourage concerted bank lending to developing countries,  to the Kenen 
Plan which would have the IMF or another international  entity  buy up debt 
at a  discount and pass along the benefits to the debtor countries,  the 
Bradley and Sachs Plans which would have the banks directly forgive 
developing—country liabilities,  and the Dornbusch Plan which permit 
countries to service their  debt in domestic currency.1/  In contrast, 
dine (1987)  and Feldatein (1987) have criticized the global approach, 
urging instead reliance on the market to resolve the crisis  through case— 
by—case negotiation. 
This is not the first  time that foreign lending  has culminated in 
default or that default has reached crisis proportions.  Nor is it the 
first time that ambitious  proposals have been elicited  by disarray in 
international  capital markets.  In the l930s,  when some two thirds of 
foreign dollar bonds lapsed  into default, a number of global  schemes for 
resolving the crisis were discussed.  Some,  like current proposals  under 
which the World Bank or International  Monetary Fund would adopt  a leading 
role,  relied on the newly—established  Bank for International  Settlements 
for mediation and liquidity.  Others advocated instead the establishment 
1 of an independent  facility controlled  by the bankers.  Some thought the 
solution lay in converting  one asset into another,  not through debt—equity 
swaps as today  but by transforming  short— and medium—term obligations into 
long—term  liabilities. Others emphasized  instead the need to index 
payments to macroeconomic indicators  such as the price level  or the value 
of exports, or to permit  debt to be serviced in local currency with 
provision for reinvesting interest  payments domestically  when transfer  was 
infeasible.  Like today, there  were those who argued the inefficacy of all 
global  plans, insisting  on the superiority  of case—by—case  negotiation. 
In the end, no global  plan was adopted.  The debt crisis of the 1930s 
was resolved by the "muddling—through"  approach  of bilateral negotiation. 
This observation  raises two questions.  First, what stumbling blocks stood 
in the way of the adoption of global  schemes?  Second,  as the crisis 
dragged  on,  how did the evolution  of debtor  and creditor strategies permit 
the crisis  to be resolved through bilateral negotiation? 
In this paper I analyze global  and bilateral approaches to dealing 
with foreign default in the interwar years.  Part I sketches the 
background to negotiations:  the origins and characteristics  of the debt 
crisis  of the l930s,  Part II then describes  the global schemes and 
bilateral negotiations.  The conclusion  suggests some implications for the 
current situation. 
Part I:  Into the Crisis 
1.  The  Tapestry of Foreign Debts 
The experience  with foreign lending in the 1920s  has been recounted 
on more than one occasion (viz,  Fleisig, 1970;  Eichengreen  and Portes, 
1986).  The aspect of the episode relevant for present purposes is that the 
2 way countries got themselves into the debt crisis of the l930s  shaped 
their options for getting out.  The nature of the shocks  which pushed the 
borrowers into default conditioned  debtor and creditor attitudes  toward 
negotiations to restart debt service.  The nature of the foreign debts 
incurred  —— their magnitude,  maturity and currency composition  —— served 
as the initial conditions  from which negotiations would commence.  The 
institutional  structures  linking the small investor  to the foreign 
government,  notably issue houses,  the secondary market for bonds, and 
bondholders' committees,  comprised the framework within  which those 
negotiations took place. 
Frequently it is suggested  that,  compared to the current environment 
of gigantic bank syndicates, lengthy loan contracts, and complex 
regulatory  restrictions, rescheduling in the 1930s was straightforward. 
The era of bond finance is portrayed as a simpler  era,  when bond covenants 
were transparent  and negotiations  had to surmount only the large  numbers 
problem created by the multitude  of small creditors,  a hurdle  which was 
successfully overcome with the creation of bondholders' reprentative 
committees.  A central message of this section is that precisely  the 
opposite was true.  Progress in debt renegotiation in the 1930s  was 
impeded  by interlocking  creditor—debtor  relationships  and by the 
proliferation  of debt instruments  ranging from short—term acceptances  to 
long—term  bonds, from  war debts to reparations,  from foreign  commercial 
deposits to foreign exchange reserves.  Freeing one thread  from this 
tapestry  without unraveling  the fabric  was the challenge for negotiators. 
The first thread in the tapestry  was made up of war debts,  in Herbert 
Feis's  evocative words, the "sludge left after the fires of the First 
World War had died down."  The stance of the United States, the principal 
3 creditor, toward  war debts shaped the attitudes  of negotiators toward 
other obligations,  Accounts of war debt negotiations  traditionally 
emphasize U.S.  intransigence,  an emphasis that  certainly is relevant 
here./  But while insisting  that war debts  were business transactions to 
be honored like  any other, by the standards of coercial  creditors the 
U.S.  displayed considerable flexibility  when negotiating  the payment 
schedule.  She did not insist  on iediate  repayment  in the exceptional 
circumstances  of the early postwar years.  The individual  agreements 
negotiated and ratified by Congress  were adapted to the economic 
circumstances  of the debtor.  The agreement  with Britain concluded in ,June 
1923,  for example, stretched out the repayment  period to more than 60 
years and reduced the interest rate from the high levels  at which Britain 
had been forced  to borrow during the war.  Arrears from the inasediate 
postwar years  were capitalized at concessional  rates that varied with the 
debtor's ability to pay.  These concessions  reflected  a  realization  on the 
part of  business interests  that U.S. prospects were linked  to the 
successful economic recovery of the heavily indebted  nations of Europe.3/ 
If the U.S.  was unwilling to simply  cancel these  debts or even to enter 
into  multilateral negotiations, she nevertheless exhibited some 
flexibility  in negotiations with individual  debtors and set an important 
precedent for subsequent  debt negotiations  by acknowledging the relevance 
of ability to pay. 
The second thread in the tapestry  was German reparations.  Their 
story is depressingly familiar.  In 1919 signatories  of the Versailles 
Treaty,  unable  to agree on an amount,  appointed a Reparations Coission 
which in April 1921 delivered a figure of 132,000  million gold marks, an 
amount  roughly twice German GNP.  Payments on 50,000  million of the 
4 132,000  million mark total were to commence immediately.  Like war debts, 
German obligations  were partially indexed to economic conditions: in 
addition  to her fixed obligation  of 2,000 million gold marks annually, 
German  would pay 26 per cent of her export revenues.  Germany's payments 
in foreign exchange and kind dwindled rapidly —— whether  due to calculated 
German strategy or a  sincere inability  to pay is still disputed today —— 
leading an exasperated France  and Belgium to occupy the Ruhr in January 
1923.  Occupation  led not to resumption of full payments but to passive 
resistance and hyperinflation.  At  year's  end,  the exhausted British, 
French  and German governments agreed to a commission to reschedule 
reparations in a manner that would buttress the precariously stabilized 
German  currency.  Under the chairmanship  of Charles Dawes,  director of the 
U.S.  Bureau of the Budget, the Commission scaled down  Germany's total 
obligation  and deferred the bulk of the payments.  Annual transfers 
started at 1,000  million gold  marks, rising  gradually to 2,500  million 
after five years.  In a significant  departure from the manner in which 
commercial  bond covenants  were structured, reparations  were indexed to 
state of the world economy (rising  or falling if the price level  varied by 
more than ten per cent).  In addition,  the payments schedule  was indexed 
to  domestic economic conditions,  as measured by such items as the volume 
of automobile  sales.  Germany's obligation ended  with the deposit of 
domestic currency to the reparation  authority's  account; responsibility 
for effecting the transfer into foreign  currency rested with the 
recipients.  If transfer difficulties  arose,  the reparations  committee  was 
to reinvest the funds  in Germany.  A foreign Agent—General  was appointed 
to monitor and enforce the provisions of the plan.  To seal the agreement, 
5 a loan of 800 million marks secured by the assets of the German railway 
system  was floated in foreign financial  centers. 
This capsule account conveys little  sense of the complexity  of 
negotiations. A  central source of difficulty  was that reparations  were 
interwoven  with other obligations, notably war debts  Notwithstanding 
U.S insistence  that the two were unrelated,  Britain, France, Belgium and 
Italy,  for whom reparations  receipts  offset war debt expenditures, were 
disinclined  to extend debt relief to Germany unless the U.S. similarly 
relieved them of wartime obligations.4/ 
The third thread in the tapestry  was made up of foreign  bonds floated 
mainly in New York in the l920s,  These  were tightly interwoven  with the 
intergovernmental  debts just described.  Not only had the process of 
large—scale  foreign lending in the 'twenties  had  been  initiated  by 
successful flotation  of the Dawes Loan in New York and London, but a 
significant  share of bonds subsequently sold in New York  on behalf of 
foreign borrowers  were floated on behalf  of Germany  and the successor 
states of Eastern  Europe that owed reparations.  Despite its disastrous 
denouement, the process was  not without logic.  Long—term borrowing  was a 
way for these countries to defer a transfer that was difficult in the 
short run.  A reparations obligation of,  say,  1,200 million marks in 1926 
could be funded by borrowing  an equal amount  from the United States, 
thereby permitting  payments to be spread out over the life of the bond. 
While the present value of the obligation was unchanged,  transfer was 
deferred until a  time when the disorganized conditions of the 1920s  could 
be surmounted.  By delaying the transfer until the productive  potential of 








































































































































Acountries  would have been permitted  to grow out  from under  the burden  of 
the  debt.5/ 
The final thread in the tapestry was short—term debt:  loans, foreign 
deposits  and acceptances. Often short—term  loans  were extended to long— 
term  borrowers  by  the syndicate of underwriting banks  and  issue houses 
over the period required  to successfully  market  their  bonds.  To these 
should  be added the foreign deposits maintained by creditor—country  banks 
and corporations  doing business  abroad,  for use in making payment  for 
goods and services purchased  from foreigners  or receiving  payment for 
those rendered,  Acceptances,  a form  of trade  credit on behalf of 
coercial  borrowers, should also  be included  under this heading.G/  As 
the  most volatile  component  of foreign  lending,  short—term  debts had 
considerable  capacity to interfere  with the balance—of—payments  position 
and hence  with the debt—servicing  capacity  of foreign  debtors. 
2.  Origins of Debt—Servicing  Difficulties 
The debt crisis of the 1930s  did not result  from any single cause. 
As in the 1980s,  it arose  out of interaction  of a sequence  of unantici- 
pated disturbances  with a set of fragile initial  conditions.  Over the 
period of large—scale  foreign lending  (1924—1928),  the sheer volume  of 
debts  to be serviced  had increased  enormously.  Annual interest  and 
amortization  payments could amount  to ten per cent of the debt 
outstanding;  thus in relatively  heavily indebted  Latin American  countries 
like  Bolivia,  Uruguay and Chile,  upwards of 15 per cent  of export  receipts 
were required to service the central  government's  external debt alone (see 
Figure  l).7/  In other  countries  where the absolute  value of the debt  was 
greater (such  as Australia  and Canada,  shown in Figure  2),  the burden 












































































































Aof export  revenues  already going  to debt service,  once new lending 
evaporated  in 1928  a  significant  transfer  from  debtor to creditor  could be 
required  to keep service  current.  The indebted  countries  were clearly 
vulnerable  to export and price—level  shocks. 
Shocks  came not in isolation  but in rapid succession.  The terms  of 
trade  of primary—product  exporting  countries  had already been deteriorating 
over the 1920s.  They then  plunged downward  with the  onset of the Great 
Depression.  The United  States  was the leading  market for primary  products, 
accounting  for nearly 40 per cent of the consumption  of the 15 leading 
industrial  countries,  and the severity  of the Depression  in the U.S. was 
unparalleled.  Between 1929 and 1930,  the terms  of trade of wheat and tin 
exporters  declined  by roughly  10 per cent, of cotton,  sugar and silk 
exporters  by 20 per cent,  of rubber  exporters  by 30 per cent.8/  By 
increasing  the cost of inelastically—demanded  imports,  the terms—of—trade 
shock left  a smaller trade surplus  for use in debt service.  That shock  was 
reinforced  by the global  deflation;  since  external debt was denominated  in 
foreign  currency (mainly  dollars)  and  bore fixed interest  rates,  the decline 
in  wholesale prices in the United  States  of approximately  10 per cent 
between 1929 and 1930 reinforced  the shock to the debt—servicing  capacity  of 
borrowing  countries.  Sovereign debt/export  ratios of most borrowing 
countries rose more  dramatically after 1928,  when foreign borrowing  had 
virtually halted, than before.  In other words,  the shock to export markets 
contributed  more  dramatically  than the preceding wave of borrowing  to the 
alarming rise in the debt  burden.  Difficulties at the periphery were 
exacerbated by increased  protectionism  at the core,  especially  since  the new 
tariffs imposed  after 1929 discriminated  against agricultural  goods.9/ 
Together,  depression  and protectionism  reduced the export  revenues of 41 
8 primary—product  exporting  countries  by some 50 per cent  between 1928—29 and 
1932—33.  The magnitude  of the shock suggests that the extent to which the 
indebted  countries  squandered  the funds they  borrowed on unproductive 
projects,  while relevant,  is of secondary importance. 
The weight of the debt and the magnitude  of the external shock,  while 
critically  important,  were not the only determinants  of default. 
Eichengreen  and Fortes (1986) have presented  a  multivariate analysis  of 
the incidence  and extent  of default in the 1930s.  The probability  of 
default  was found  to rise  with both the debt/income  ratio  and the percent 
deterioration  in the terms  of trade.  But in addition,  domestic policy 
responses  to the Depression,  notably the change  in the government  budget 
deficit, also  affected the tendency to default,  Countries which  adopted 
draconian  fiscal  responses  to the budget deficits induced  by the 
macroeconomic  slump  were less likely  to default than other countries  with 
similar debt/income  ratios,  similar terms—of—trade  shocks, but more 
expansionary fiscal  policies.  Default depended  not only on the external 
shock but on the domestic  response. 
Part II: Out of the Crisis 
1.  Global Plans 
The challenge facing  those attempting  to renegotiate  debts in the 
1930s was how to deal with the overlapping  nature  of different 
liabilities.  These interdependencies  were what gave special appeal  to 
global plans. 
9 (i)  The Bank for International  Settlements  (1930—32) 
The moat straightforward  global  approach to the debt crisis  would 
have  been to empower the Bank for International  Settlements. The B.I.S. 
had been founded in 1930  as part of the Young Plan rescheduling  of German 
reparations.  France  and Britain had never  been satisfied  with the Dawes 
Plan apparatus  on the grounds that achieving the transfer  was not properly 
the responsibility  of Germany's  creditors  and their  Agent—General.  At the 
sane time,  they hesitated  to place discretionary  power in German  hands. 
Hence the establishment  of an international  bank to perform these 
financial  functions.10/ 
Having  been established  to manage  reparations, it was logical to ask 
whether the B.I,S.  might be used to address  other debt problems. 
According  to J.W.  Beyen (Alternate  of the President  of the B.I.S. from 
1935 to 1937,  President from 1937 to 1940,  and author of the Beyen Plan 
discussed  below),  the B.I.S.  was initially  conceived not just to 
administer  reparations  but  "also  for international  loans  floated either in 
connection  with reparation  payments or for other  purposes."ll/  In a 
proposal reminiscent  of those  for an expanded role for the IMF today, 
Hubert  Henderson  of the  British Economic Advisory  Council suggested  that 
the B.I.S.  might issue  unbacked "International  Certificates,"  to be 
allocated  to countries  in proportion  to the gold value  of their exports in 
1928.  The receipts  could  be used for any purpose,  including  presumably 
the maintenance  of debt service. 12/ 
The suggestion  bore no fruit,  due in part to the financial  position 
of the E.I.S. itself.  Having  made unsuccessful loans  in defence of the 
gold standard to Austria,  Germany and Hungary in 1931, many of Bank's 
assets  were frozen.  The profits derived from the everyday  business of 
10 collecting  German reparations  in Reichsmarks  and converting  them to francs 
and sterling  were eliminated  by the Hoover  Moratorium.  The balance sheet 
total  of the 8.1.5. fell from two  billion Swiss gold francs  at the 
beginning of 1931 to barely  one—third that  amount in 1933.  The 8.1.5.  had 
little  liquidity  of its own to inject  into the international  system,  while 
creditor—country  governments  hesitated  to entrust new foreign lending  to 
an institution  with so dismal  a record  of loan administration. 
B.I.S.  officials  took little  initiative  to raise  additional  capital 
or to lobby  for a  more active  role,  and concentrated  instead  on fostering 
cooperation  among central  banks.  Exchange—rate  stability  rather  than 
foreign  debts became their  primary  concern.  This is unsurprising  since 
the 8.1.5.  was a creature  of the creditor countries  and since the 
governors  of their central  banks  dominated its Board.  These  officials 
attached  priority to the instability  of currencies  rather  than to the 
collapse of foreign  lending.  Indeed,  to insulate  efforts to insure 
international  currency stability  from impinging  political  pressures,  the 
statutes  of the 8.I.S. prohibited  the new institution  from extending  loans 
directly to governments.fl/ After their unsatisfactory  encounter  with 
sovereign lending  in 1931,  central  banks were disinclined  to alter these 
statutes  or to contemplate  yet more ambitious  initiatives.  If a  global 
solution to the debt crisis  was in the offing,  it would  not originate  with 
the B.I.S. 
(ii)  The Kindersley—Norman  Plan (1931) 
Attributed  variously  to Sir Robert  Kindersley,  Chairman  of Lazard 
Brothers and a director of the Bank of England, Sir Charles  Addis,  one 
time British representative  to the Reichsbank,  and  Montagu  Norman, 
Governor of the Bank of England,  this scheme  came to be known as the 
11 Norman  Plan once the  lovernor presented it at a  meeting of the directors 
of the B.I.S.  Resembling  ideas offered  previously  by Hjalmar Schacht 
among others,  the plan was to establish  a special international  facility, 
resembling  the Bretton Woods institutions  to be founded  after World  War 
II, to make loans  to foreign  countries  and corporations  incapable  of 
obtaining  them through normal  channels.  The facility  would  be 
independent,  not a branch  of the B.LS.14/ 
The corporation,  to be headquartered  in Holland or Switzerland  for 
fiscal  reasons,  would  be endowed  with a  board  of directors  on which the 
bankers and other  financiers would be represented.  While Britain and 
possibly  also Switzerland  and Holland  would help fund the facility,  the 
major  contributions  were to come from the U.S.  and France,  the two 
countries  running  significant  balance—of--payments  surpluses.  "World 
recovery  will be impeded,"  read the original version  of the Plan "by the 
fact that the U.S.  and France,  instead  of lending  back to the world their 
surplus for a usable balance of payment,  have  been taking this  surplus in 
the form of gold."15/  Signficiantly, however, most of the money to be 
lent would come  not from governments  but from private investors.  The 
scheme  envisaged  a corporation  with 25—5O million of ordinary  capital, 
put up by governments  and the B.I.S.,  and the power to issue  bonds in 
amounts  up to three times  the value of subscribed  capital.  The 
corporation  would lend to "such Foreign  Governments,  Municipalities, 
Mortgage Banks,  Harbour  Boards,  Railways  and Public  Utility Companies,  as 
are in need of funds  which cannot  be obtained  at the time through 
customary  channels,  and are in a  position to offer really  good security." 
These loans would have the effect  "of reestablishing  the credit  of the 
foreign  Governments,  corporations,  etc.,  to whom the money is lent,  to 
12 [sic]  improving  the price of their  securities  in all markets of the world, 
and the purchasing  power of their  nationals.  . . 
This debt  would take  the form of debentures  purchased in the creditor 
countries  by banks,  issue  houses,  and corporations  and companies  "of any 
magnitude."  Trust and  insurance  companies,  as owners  of existing bonds, 
were likely customers  since they  were "vitally  interested"  in steps that 
might repair  the credit  of foreign  debtors,  Industrial  firms dependent  on 
export  markets similarly  might  be willing to subscribe.  Other investors 
could  be encouraged  through  moral suasion.  The cost to the borrowers 
would  be one to two per cent over the yield to the bondholders,  the margin 
to be placed in the corporation's  reserve for contingencies. 
Memos describing  the plan fail to explain why banks and issue  houses, 
otherwise  disinclined  to lend  to illiquid  debtors in 1931,  might  willingly 
contribute  HOO—150  million to such  a facility.  One possibility  is that 
underwriting  governments  might have  guaranteed  the loans  to financially 
embarrassed  borrowers, although this would have  greatly increased their 
financial commitment.17/  Another is that  new  loans  might be granted 
seniority  relative to old ones.lB/  By backing  not specific loans  but its 
entire  portfolio  with its !25—50  million of capital,  the corporation  might 
have been able to pool default risk  more effectively  than smaller 
creditors.  Debtor—country  authorities  might have been less inclined  to 
default on loans  extended  by an international  facility,  extending  them the 
kind of favored treatment  usually reserved  for League  of Nations  loans. 
Perhaps the corporation's  loans  to fund  private investment  or public  works 
would succeed in restarting  growth,  thereby reducing  debt/income  ratios 
and restoring  creditworthiness. 
13 To what extent  was the Kindersley—Norman  Plan a sincere effort to 
deal  specifically  with default and the collapse of foreign  lending,  not 
simply  a device  to prop  up sterling  by inducing  France  and the U.S. to 
stimulate  the demand for British exports  by debtor  nations?  The Plan  was 
developed and presented to the B.I.S.  at the same time  other talks  were 
underway  for strengthening  sterling.  In November  and December  1930, 
Norman  was discussing  the possibility  of Britain floating a long—term  loan 
in France  to reduce its short—term  liabilities  to foreigners.19/ Clarke's 
(1967, p.181)  view is that  the proposal  as presented  to the B.l.S.  was at 
bottom  an attempt to obtain  "indirect  support  for Britain's  financial 
position:"  This  seems  more plausible  than to assume that the British  were 
operating  out of altruism,  While it remains true that loans  to indebted 
countries  would have helped  them keep current  the service on their 
sterling  debts1  the tendency  of this to buttress  Britain's financial 
position  would have been only one effect  of the initiative, 
Insofar  as the Kinderaley—Norman  Plan represented  an effort  to deal 
with the problems  of debtor  nations1 it is not entirely clear  which 
nations  British officials  had in  mind.  Skidelsky (1967) and Kindleberger 
(1973) suggest  that they  were concerned  mainly  to assist  Britain's 
traditional  export  markets:  Germany,  Eastern  Europe,  Australia  and South 
America.  Except for Australia (where  the threat  of default by New South 
Wales in 1931 did not turn into actuality),  these  were the principal 
regions  where default ultimately  took place.  Hel)ce  an amply—funded 
institution  directing  foreign capital to these regions  might have done 
much to head off the debt crisis. 
In the end,  the Kinderaley—Norman  Plan came to naught.  As early as 
January 1931  Norman confessed  that the plan  was not particularly 
14 practical,  by which he meant that  it was unlikely  to be favorably 
received.Q/  As Thomas  Lamont's  Paris partner reported  following  the 9 
February 1931 meeting of the B.I.S.  at which  Norman's  memo was read,  "no 
comments  were made and no special interest  was shown in it."J  Merle 
Cochran,  the Aserican Consul in  Basle,  was more blunt,  describing  how the 
plan  was poorly  received since it placed  the blame for the collapse  of 
foreign lending  on France and the United  States.22/ 
A related  problem,  as Norman  admitted to his Awerican colleague 
Harrison,  was "the  unwillingness,  which  we have seen in certain  quarters, 
to support a scheme  of which the control  and the funds are truly 
international."23/  J.E. Crane,  Deputy  Governor of the New York Fed in 
charge  of foreign  affairs,  concluded  that U.S.  reluctance  to lend  abroad 
would  not be dissipated  by a scheme  over which New York had little 
control.  J.P. Morgan and colleagues  voiced  their unwillingness  to 
purchase foreign  bonds through the agency  of an international  corporation 
over which they  had only limited  control,  and which  might be influenced  by 
foreign  politicians  and attacked  by Populist  Congressmen. Rather than 
create  artificial  agencies,  Morgana insisted  that  new loans  meet the 
market  test.  The most that should  be done was to appoint  an advisory 
committee  to stimulate  private  bankers "to go ahead with their  own 
projects."24/  Even this modest  proposal to improve  the climate for 
lending  met a mixed reception. 
France's resistance  was even  stronger.  Since the lion's  share of the 
funds was likely  to come from France,  the Paris commercial  banks and even 
the Bank of France insisted  that control over  any new corporation  rest in 
French  hands.  In the event  such a scheme  was adopted, the French  favored 
several separate institutions,  one for agricultural  loans, one for railway 
15 construction,  and so forth.25/  But the French  and Belgians agreed  that 
the initiative  for formulating  such  a pian properly  rested  with bsnkers, 
not governments.26/ 
(iii)  The Beyen and Crena de Jongh  Plans (1932) 
The Beyen and Crena de  .Jongh Plans  were floated in the winter of 
1931—32.  Compared  with other plans  discussed  here,  their  scope  was 
limited:  they  were designed to address the problem of short—term  debts, 
not default on long—term  bonds. 
Beyen made his proposal to the Standstill  Conferance  in the  winter of 
193L27/  This  conference  arose  out of the threat  to creditor—country 
banks and acceptance houses  due to the German financial crisis,2B/  German 
banks  and firms relied heavily  on  short—term credits  from  abroad.29/  The 
prospect  that the repayment  of credits  might  be interrupted  by the German 
financial  crisis  posed a serious threat  to the London  acceptance  houses. 
These institutions  specialized  in the extension  of trade credits, 
advancing to foreign exporters  the funds  they would receive once their 
goods  were shipped  and payment  was received,  Payment  when  received was 
passed along to the owner  of the acceptance, interest  earned taking  the 
form of the spread between the payment  received and the amount  advanced to 
the exporter.  In practice, British acceptance houses  resold their paper 
to the market,  functioning  as intermediaries  rather than investing  their 
own capital in the acceptance  business.  Their reputation  served  as 
guarantee  in the event  that the debtor  failed  to deliver the  money on the 
date required.  So long  as default  on these  short—term  debts  was 
exceptional,  the acceptance  houses  could treat it as a cost of doing 
business.  But if many debtors defaulted  simultaneously  or their 
16 governments  imposed  exchange  control, the acceptance  houses themselves 
could  be pushed into default. 
This delicate  mechanism functioned  smoothly  because the acceptance 
houses  could count  on support from the Bank of England.  But the Bank of 
England had its own regulations  to  obey;  it could  not extend loans  to the 
acceptance  houses  on unacceptable  collateral,  or so its Governor,  Montagu 
Norman,  argued.30/  Hence  for the Bank to lend in 1931 it was necessary to 
maintain  the pretence that German  credit  was still good.  Under the 
provisions  of the first German  Standstill  Agreement  concluded in Basis 
under the auspices  of the B,I.S. on August  19, 1931,  participating  bankers 
agreed  not to call in outstanding  credits  nor to cancel the credit lines 
under  which German debtors  could draw bills.  Bankers  who refused to sign 
could of course  call in their credit  outstanding  but would receive  only 
blocked Reichsmarks  under the provisions  of German exchange  control.31/ 
The governments  involved  put considerable  pressure on the bankers to sign. 
In Beyen's  view,  this charade  would eventually  be seen through, 
leading to runs on financial institutions.  Default on short—term  debts, 
in his view,  was more serious than default  on long—term loans.  While  not 
belittling  the seriousness  of default  on bonds,  he concluded that 
"whatever  the loan  contracts  may say to the contrary,  the capital  is in 
fact not called  for, and the default on interest  payments does  not 
seriously  hamper the economic life  of the debtor  country until it needs  to 
borrow  again."32/  As a  banker, he regarded  default  on short—term  debts 
the more serious threat  to financial  stability. 
Beyen's proposal to the second  Standstill  Conference  that met in 
Berlin  in December 1931, at which he was a member of the Dutch  delegation, 
was to convert  short—term credits into long—term  loans repayable in 
17 installments  over a  period  of of 20 years.  There  was no plan for 
government  to assume obligations  incurred  by the private sector  or for 
other  administrative  changes.  Each debtor  was to be considered 
individually.  If the problem  was not one of illiquidity,  which could  be 
resolved  simply  by lengthening  the maturity of the debt,  but one of the 
insolvency  of a foreign  corporate  debtor,  then the remaining  assets  of the 
company  should be allocated  among  the creditors,  natives and foreigners 
receiving  equal treatment.  But in Beyen's view the problem  was mainly  one 
of illiquidity,  not insolvency,  If this could  be dealt  with by 
lengthening  the  maturity of the debt,  repayment  could begin and German 
exchange controls  could  be lifted,  The creditworthiness  of the debtor 
having  been restored,  the normal  operation  of international  capital 
markets could recolmsence, 
In the event  that a debtor  country did not succeed in earning foreign 
exchange  adequate to service the long—term  debt,  there  would  be provision 
for payment in local  currency.  In the event of a foreign exchange 
shortage,  debtor  countries  would be permitted to extend preferential 
treatment  to creditor countries  who were their  best customers;  creditors 
running  bilateral deficits  would have first  claim on the available  foreign 
exchange. 
To say that the Beyen  Plan was unenthusiastically  received  is to put 
it mildly.  The bankers preferred  to maintain the charade  of business  as 
usual in the hope that  events  might turn for the better.  Germany, 
embroiled  in reparations  negotiations,  insisted that  servicing even long— 
term loans  was impossible  in light of the limited availability  of foreign 
exchange.  Given the interlocking  nature  of different  debt instruments,  a 
global  plan limited  to short—term  debts  was not global  enough. 
18 An alternative  to the Beyen Plan was submitted to the Standstill 
Committee  by another Dutch  banker,  Crena de Jongh,  It took a different 
approach to lengthening  the maturity structure  of the debt.  In contrast 
to the Beyen Plan,  creditors  were to repay  their  short—term  debts on 
schedule,  but in local  currency  rather than  foreign exchange.  A central 
administrator  would issue  foreign—currency—denominated  bonds to be 
serviced  with the return  from investing  the funds stemming from the 
repayment  of short—term  loans  by domestic  debtors.  Where the Beyen Plan 
relieved  domestic debtors  of the obligation  to repay in the short run,  the 
Crena  de Jongh Plan  would have required  domestic  debtors to make prompt 
payment,  albeit in local currency.  If Crena  de Jongh viewed the crisis 
simply  as a transfer  problem, Beyen  viewed it principally  as a problem of 
domestic  illiquidity  that would have interrupted  service even had the 
short—term  obligations been  denominated in domestic  currency.  In contrast 
to  the Beyen  Plan,  which failed to specify the composition  of the agency 
which would collect and adminiater the foreign  exchange, under the Crena 
de Jongh Plan administration  was placed firmly in the hands of creditor— 
country banks. 
As Beyen (1951,  p.69)  put it, the Crena  de Jongh Plan "met with as 
little response  from the Standstill  creditors  as my suggestions." 
(iv)  The World Economic  Conference (1933) 
The World Economic Conference  which convened in London  on 12 June 
1933  was an outgrowth  of the conference  on intergovernmental  debts held at 
Lausanne in 1932.  Part of the rationale  for the London Conference  was the 
feeling,  especially  prevalent in  Europe,  that the problems of war debts, 
commercial  debts,  deflation,  exchange—rate  stability  and trade  warfare 
could only  be resolved if all were addressed  simultaneously. Despite or 
19 perhaps  because of these interconnections,  debts  remained,  in the view of 
the Europeans,  one of the central issues  to be taken up in  London.  But 
the United  States still regarded  war debts as off limits.  Consequently, 
the agenda for London  was limited  to money and credit  policies,  exchange— 
rate  stabilization,  and tariff  and and nontariff  barriers to trade,  With 
the dollar's devaluation  on the eve of the conference  and President 
Roosevelt's  refusal to agree  to its early stabilization,  European 
delegations  increasingly  focused on  what they perceived  as the ongoing 
disintegration  of the international  monetary system. 
The heavily indebted  countries  of Latin  America and Eastern Europe 
saw things  differently  and did their  utmost to remind  creditor—country 
governments  of the urgency of the debt crisis.  In a series  of preparatory 
meetings with U.S.  officials in Washington,  D.C.,  they advocated  ambitious 
initiatives  to restart international  capital  flows.  The idea  of a 
"normalization  fund" to funnel  capital to countries  requiring  foreign 
funds in order to restart debt  service and to fund public  works programs 
had been mooted  by the Special  British Mission.33/  Britain proposed  an 
international  fund of $1500 to $2000  million, to be subscribed  by 
creditor—country  governments and designed to make  loans to debtor—country 
central banks,  which  would respond  by lifting trade  barriers and exchange 
controls.  One after another,  debtor—country  delegations  endorsed the 
proposal.  The Rumanians  argued  that this initiative  was essential  for the 
recovery  of countries  with no domestic  financial  market to finance deficit 
spending.  Their representative  stated "with  great emphasis  that it should 
be clear that  some international  arrangement  simply  has got to be  worked 
out to help them."34/  Turkey  proposed the establishment  of an 
"international  credit  bank" to promote international  capital flows.35/ 
20 Czechoslovakia,  though  not among the most heavily indebted  nations, 
acknowledged  the dependence  of its economic  prospects  on the recovery  of 
its trading  partners  and attached  great importance  to "the general 
alleviation  of the indebtedness  of the Central and Eastern Europen 
agricultural  countries  which were formerly  her best customers."36/ 
But with intergovernmental  debts off limits,  it was hard to hold a 
productive  discussion  of commercial  obligations. Had she entertained 
Latin  American and European  proposals for a  wide—ranging solution  to the 
problem of commercial  debts,  the U.S.  would have undermined  the official 
position that  it was inappropriate  to reconsider  intergovernmental  debts. 
In private, U.S.  officials  admitted  that an international  fund to lend to 
countries  requiring  capital inflows to aid recovery  could  not be pushed 
through  Congress.  As they put it to the Polish  ambassador,  "American 
experience  with respect  to international  loans has not been sufficiently 
happy  to encourage it to enter into  additional  obligations,"37/ In the 
end,  debt  was not extensively  discussed  in London.  The atmosphere  was 
best summed  up by Beyen, who again  appears on the scene this time as 
deputy  delegate from the Netherlands.  "We met in the Geological  Museum at 
Kensington,"  he subsequently  wrote,  "and none of our activities  disturbed 
the fossils."38/ 
2.  Negotiations  Setweeen Governments 
With the rejection  of global  plans,  negotiations  were officially  left 
in private hands,  One wonders how the give and take between debtor  and 
creditor  would have  been shaped  had governments  been more intimately 
involved.  Some light  can be shed on the question  by considering  war debts 
and reparations,  where official involvement  was inevitable  because 
governments  were both the major creditors  and the  major debtors. 
21 The Dawes  Plan under which  German reparations  had been rescheduled 
in 1924  was never conceived  as a permanent  solution.  A  new committee 
which differed  from the Dawes Committee  by virtue  of Germany's  full and 
equal  representation  was appointed in January 1929 to effect such a 
solution,  Fatigued  by endless  disputes,  those involved  hoped  for a 
settlement  that would entail  early  evacuation  of the Rbinelsnd,  which had 
been occupied in the course  of previous reparations  quarrels,  and 
elimination  of the extraordinary  provisions  of the Dawes Plan,  notably a 
foreign  Agent—General  on German soil to collect earmarked  revenues  and 
administer  their  transfer into foreign  currency. 
In line  with previous  policy,  the U.S.  government  did not participate 
in the conference  out of fear that its involvement  would  be seen as 
acknowledgement  of the linkage  of war debts and reparations.  Instead  it 
provided the committee's  neutral  chairman,  Owen 0. Young (corporate 
executive,  former  Agent—General  for reparations,  and current  director of 
the Federal  Reserve Bank of New York),  Negotiators  eliminated  those 
provisions  of the Dawes Plan that  Germany found  most objectionable, 
notably  a reparations  agency  to monitor German  finances.  Not only  waa the 
bill scaled down and pushed  further into the future,  but Germany's 
obligation  was once again  indexed to economic conditions:  the total  was 
split, with provision  that the second,  or conditional,  tranche could  be 
deferred in the event of transfer  problems. 
The Young Plan represented  a significant  reduction  of Germany's 
reparations  payments.  The principal  stumbling  block to further  steps  in 
the direction  of realism remained  U.S.  intransigence  on war debts.  The 
relationship  of reparations  to war debts was readily  acknowledged  by other 
governments:  under the Young Plan  Germany's reparations  bill would be 
22 reduced automatically  by at least  two—thirds  of any  war debt relief 
extended  by the U.S.  To circumvent  U.S.  objections,  this  rider  was 
contained  in a separate  "concurrent  memorandum." 
The prominent  feature  of the Young  Plan was its short  life.  The 
Great Depression  underscored  the fantastic  nature  of the transfer 
schedule,  swiftly rendering  the plan redundant.  The problem of 
acknowledging  this reality  was again  the linkage  with war debts. 
President  Hoover  vacillated  out of fear that a moratorium  on reparations 
and war debts  would destroy once  and for all U.S.  ability to deny the 
existence  of a link,39/  In the event,  the severity  of the Depression  and 
the outbreak of financial  crisis in Austria and Germany left little 
choice.  The Hoover  Moratorium  announced  on 20 June 1931 suspended  all 
payments on all intergovernmental  debts. 
The moratorium  was designed to last for a year.  To negotiate  a more 
durable  solution,  national  delegations  assembled  once  more in Lausanne in 
June 1932.  The U.S. was absent  yet again, this time  because  Congress,  in 
an election year,  had passed  a resolution  prohibiting  the Administration 
from negotiating  any reduction  in foreign  debts.  In light  of the 
continued  deterioration  of economic  conditions,  radical  concessions  were 
made on reparations. To extinguish  her obligation,  Germany was required 
only to deliver H50  million (or }4 3 billion) of five  per cent redeemable 
bonds to the 8.1.3., which amounted  to about  one year's  transfer  under the 
1921  plan.  But under "the  Gentlemen's  Agreement,"  ratification  of this 
plan was made contingent  upon the successful  conclusion  of parallel 
negotiations  on war debts. 
British officials  argued  that  concessions  were in the interest  of 
even the United  States.  They regarded  debt relief  not simply  in terms  of 
23 the feasibility  of repayment  but in terms of global repercussions. 
"Experience  has,  in  fact,  shown," Sir H, Lindsay  wrote, "that  when dealing 
with international  transfers  of the character  and of the unprecedented 
magnitude  of the post—war intergovernmental  obligations,  the principle  of 
"the capacity  to pay" of the debtor  —— even if thus applied —— can only be 
regarded  as of secondary  importance  compared  with an even  wider principle, 
viz,,  that  of the capacity of the world to endure  the economic  and 
financial  consequences  which those  transfers  would involve."Q/ 
By insisting  on prompt  payment of intereet  and principal,  the British 
argued,  the United  States  was worsening  the Great  Depression.  Between 
1929  and 1932  manufacturing  production  in the U.S.  had fallen  by  48 per 
cent, and  unemployment  had risen to nearly 24 per  cent of the American 
lshor force,  Under such circnmstances it  was unrealistic  to suppose  that 
the U.S.  would  willingly increase  its imports  from Britain.  It was 
equally  difficult  for the U.K.  to increase  exports  since, in contrast with 
coercial  debts  incurred for productive  purposes  —— what  the British 
called "self—liquidating"  loans  —— it had not been possible  to invest  the 
war loans  productively.  Absent the option  of increasing  exports,  the U.K. 
could service  its debts only  by shipping  gold.  British gold exports would 
add to the concentration  of reserves  in the U.S.,  forcing  monetary 
contraction  on the rest of the world.4l/  The balance—of—payments 
difficulties  caused  by such transfers  encouraged  exchange control, 
bilateral clearing  and the further  disintegration  of the international 
monetary system,  whose reconstruction  the British viewed  as essential  to 
recovery  from the slump.  As a result  of U.S. war debt policy,  the British 
argued,  "The international  monetary  mechanism  without which the modern 
world cannot  effectively  conduct  its daily life is being broken into 
24 pieces  with all the manifold forms  of privation  and distress  which this 
involves."42/ Even the U.S. would benefit from  wiping the slate clean  of 
debts if this  permitted reconstruction  of the international  financial 
system. 
British observers  did not overlook  the irony  of American inability  to 
see the logic  of their  position,  especially  when exceptional  measures like 
farm foreclosure  moritoria  were being adopted  domestically.  Sir Frederick 
Leith—Ross,  chief economic  advisor to the British  government,  submitted 
the following  satire to the editor  of Punch.43/ 
"A Tip to our Statesmen" 
"'You  cannot  expect,'  said my American friend,  'the farmer  of Iowa to 
understand  the advantages  of debt cancellation.  It is no good preaching 
economics  to him;  he is a hard—boiled  fellow  who considers  that a debt is 
a debt and a debtor is a dog.  What you have got to do is to follow  his 
methods. 
Now,  in Iowa, debt cancellation  is unknown.  Debt repudation  is 
unheard  of.  Debts  must be honoured.  How are they honoured?  A farmer 
can't  pay debts  out of deficits.  His Bank forecloses,  A salesman  comes 
down to collect.  How does he collect?  Lie  advertises  the property.  The 
neighbours  attend.  They stand  around,  and to make sure that the 
proceedings  are all correct and above  board and that the saleman  does not 
quit betimes they  put a halter around  his neck,  Then the bidding  opens. 
It is not brisk.  Prospective  purchasers  find  a gun firmly  planted in 
their ribs.  It discourages  them.  Finally,  the farmer  concerned,  or a 
friend,  bids a dollar,  and the debt is  settled. 
This procedure  is  simple,  practical  and perfectly  effective:  and 
there seems  no reason  why it should  not be given  a wider application. The 
World  Conference  is to meet in in  London.  As its first  proceedings,  the 
Chairman  will no doubt emphasise  the need for getting  together.  He will 
quote amid resounding  cheers the encouraging  references to good 
neighbouring relations  uttered  by Mr.  Franklin  0. Roosevelt.  He will  then 
call upon the American representatives  to deal with the question of  debts. 
The representatives  of the United States  will place on the table the Bonds 
of the Allied  Governments  and will express the unanimous  conviction  of 
Senate  and Congress that these debts  must be encashed 
'Well,' says the Chairman,  'let's  see what we can get for them,  Any 
bids?' 
No bids forthcoming  from the United  Kingdom?  From France?  no:  Italy? 
No:  Belgium?  No:  Holland?  No: Germany?  at this  point Hitler  raises  his 
25 arm  with a gesture that  commands attention,  'Fin  Mark'.  From the opposite 
end of the  Conference room  the representative  of the Soviet  Union  shouts 
'Em  rouble'.  He is hastily  ejected.  Hitler  has it.  He collects  the 
bonds and from  henceforward  the world is his debtnr.  Hail Hitler! 
After all,  it might not be a bad way out." 
As the Depression  deepened,  U.S.  officials  hesitantly  began to 
entertain  alternatives.  Hoover's  Secretary  of State,  Henry Stimson,  while 
opposing  unilateral  cancellation,  in 1932  suggested  trading debt 
concessions  for access  to British and  Commonwealth  markets.M/ Progress 
slowed  and rhetoric  escalated  with the approach of the 1932 presidential 
election.  The Hoover  Moratorium  having  expired in the autumn  of 1932, 
immediately  following  the election France  and Britain requested  a 
suspension  of the December  1932 installment,  which the Americans  refused. 
France  then defaulted  on her payment,  and Britain took the symbolic  step 
of paying  the entire  installment  in gold to protest against  U.S. 
accumulation  of gold and hesitancy  to reflate.  When the next installment 
came  due six months later, Britain  made only token  payment and six other 
debtors  defaulted,  In June 1934,  Congress  condemned  token payments,  in 
response  to which the British, like  the others, paid nothing at all.  War 
debts  and reprations  sputtered  out like a candle  in the rain. 
Whet do these  negotiations  reveal  about  governments'  attitudes  toward 
the renegotiation  of foreign debts?  Three  points emerge.  First,  to a 
greater  degree than  many private  lenders,  public  officials  acknowledged 
the relevance  of ability  to pay.  Had governments  participated  more 
actively  in the renegotiation  of commercial  debts in the 1930s,  commercial 
creditors  might have been forced  to more quickly accept  ability—to—pay 
criteria,  Second,  although  govenments  should  have been best eble to 
appreciate  the impact of default  on the world economy  as a whole,  U.S. 
26 attitudes toward  war debts  reveal that  some major governments  appreciated 
these impacts  incompletely.  Third,  because of the existence  of 
interlocking  debtor—creditor  relationships,  governments  found  it 
impossible  to reschedule  one form of foreign debt  without at the same time 
considering  the others. 
3.  Bilateral  Negotiations 
The alternative  to global approaches  to the debt crisis  was to deal 
with defaults  on a case—by—case  basis.  The difficulty  with initiating 
negotiations  between borrowers and  bondholders  was determining  who 
represented  the latter.  Typically, representative  committees  of 
bondholders  were organized.  It is tempting  to view these  committees  as an 
efficient  solution  to the bargaining  game  between creditors  and debtors. 
All parties could  gain if through negotiations  they  moved toward the core 
of cooperative  solutions.  The bondholders  would gain if at least  token 
interest  payments  were restarted.  The debtors  would gain if, through  the 
payment of some interest,  sanctions  prohibiting  the flotation  of new 
issues  on behalf of foreign borrowers in  default,  like those regularly 
imposed  by the London  market, were removed,  By facilitating  negotiation, 
a  bondholders  representative  committee  might improve  the position of all 
those involved  and still  keep a slice  of the pie for itself. 
In Britain, the mechanism  through which  negotiations  took place  was 
firmly  established  by the lB3Os.  The Corporation  of Foreign Bondholders 
(CFBH) was universally  acknowledged to speak for the bondholders.  Founded 
in 1868,  the CFBH was composed initially  of representatives  of the issue 
houses and of individual  bondholders.45/  In 1898 it was reorganized  by an 
Act of Parliament;  henceforth  the  Council of the  Corporation, its 
governing  body,  was made up of representatives  of the  British Bankers' 
27 Association,  representatives  of the London Chamber of Commerce,  and 
miscellaneous  members at least six  of whom were substantial bondholders. 
Removing  representatives  of the issue  houses  was designed to allay fears 
that the CFBH was a mere organ of the underwriters,  thereby  permitting  the 
government  to delegate  to the Council responsibility  for all disputes over 
defaulted  debts.  By the 1930s,  representatives  of the British Bankers 
Association,  the London  Chamber of Commerce and individual  bondholders 
were joined  on the Council  by representatives  of the Association  of 
Investment  Trusts  and the British Insurance  Association —  representing 
institutions  with substantial  holdings  of foreign  bonds —— along with the 
Stock Exchange  and the Bank of England. 
The official  British government  position  was that default on foreign 
loans  was a private  matter.  Officials  found it convenient  to have a 
reputable  bondholders'  committee to  which disgruntled  investors  could  be 
referred,  To infer  from  this that  the British government  did not involve 
itself  in debt negotiations  would be incorrect,  however.  Rather than 
divorcing  itself  from  negotiations,  when bondholders  and issue  houses 
attempted  to enlist  government  assistance,  they  were required  to do so via 
the CFBH.  The CFBH's  minutes noted in  1937,  for example,  "We know that 
the Treasury expect  any request  for Government  action  to be made to them 
by this  Council and Messrs Lazards,  have,  I understand,  been informed  of 
this attitude. "46/ 
Government  assistance  took various  forms.  Upon learning  of 
developments  that improved  the prospects  for productive  negotiations,  the 
government  might pass the information  to the Council.  Information  on the 
political  and economic  situation  might  be obtained from the local  Embassy. 
To initiate  negotiations,  the CFBH might rely  on the local  Embassy staff 
28 and the Ambassador  himself.  Although communications  from the CFBH to 
foreign officials  might be conveyed  by the Ambassador,  the CFBH did not 
hesitate  to remind  Embassy officials  that the Council did the negotiating. 
When the British Ambassador  to Brazil hesitated  to convey  a sharply worded 
memorandum  and recommended  specific revisions,  the CFBH instructed  the 
Foreign  Office that "the  Memorandum  should  be delivered  to the Brazilians 
without further delay...we  have no reason to modify its terms."47/  The 
price paid for government  assistance  was pressure  when settlement  was 
desired for diplomatic  or military reasons.  In July of 1939,  with the 
British government  anxious  to conclude a political  treaty  with Greece as a 
bulwark against German  expansion,  the Chancellor  of the Exchequer and the 
Foreign Secretary  pressed the Council to accept  Greece's debt offer to 
facilitate  the successful  conclusion  of treaty  negotiations.  According  to 
the CFBH,  the Chancellor "in so many words...,  advised us to take whatever 
was available."48/ The CFBH refused.  Thus,  there is no evidence  that the 
price of government  assistance  was particularly  high. 
In the United  States,  the mechanism for negotiations  remained 
incompletely  formed  when default  broke out.  As late  as 1913 the U.S. had 
remained  a net foreign  borrower. Foreign flotations  on the scale  of those 
witnessed in the 1920s were a  new phenomenon  for the American capital 
market.49/  There had  been no occasion  to establish  a standing  committee 
representing  American  bondholders.  Initially,  ad hoc committees  were 
established  to negotiate  resolutions  to individual  defaults.  As default 
spread,  the shortcomings  of the approach  became evident.50/ Committees 
set up to negotiate  over individual  bond issues  had higher  administrative 
expenses than  an ongoing  organization.  Temporary  committees,  with little 
reputation  to protect,  might be set up by questionable  individuals  lured 
29 by generous coissions into preying  on ill—informed  bondholders.  Rival 
coittees  set up by issue houses, disaffected  bondholders  and independent 
entrepreneurs  might  compete for bondholder  allegiance.  Each  wishing to be 
first to conclude  a  negotiated  settlement,  the debtor could  play off one 
coamdttee  against another.  Ad  hoc coittees lacked established  ties with 
government and, unlike the British  Council,  were unable  to credibly 
threaten  sanctions prohibiting future flotations, 
In response  to these problems,  the Foreign  Bondholders  Protective 
Council (FBPC)  was founded in 1933.  As Herbert Feis (the  State Department 
official involved) tells the  story,  government officials  were intimately 
involved.5l/  Having published in 1930 his classic study of prewar  lending 
(Feis,  1930), Feis explicitly adopted the British Council  as the model  for 
the new  American organization,  battling both  sceptical officials  who 
opposed  government support for the  new organization  and  bankers  who wished 
to control it.  Because  requests for intervention from bondholders  were 
absorbing so much time,  the  idea of a bondholders' association was 
favorably  received in the Hoover Athsinistration's State Department  in 
1932.  A conittee  was  set  up under State  Department sponsorship to draw 
up plans for a private organization.  One  problem  was how to finance the 
committee without  relying on public funds or  the  banks,  either of which 
might undermine the independence of the  new association.  The  solution was 
to solicit finance from charitable foundations and  the  Stock  Exchange 
until commissions rendered  the FBPC  self—sustaining.  Another problem  was 
determining whether  the  FBPC would  conduct  negotiations  itself or simply 
discourage the  formation of competing  committees by conferring  its stamp 
of approval  on  a particular committee.  The  1933 banking crisis did more 
than  Feis's arguments to defeat  the proposal  that the bankers  form the 
30 committees  and the FBPC play only a facilitating  role.  A final  problem 
was enlisting  the support of both the banks and the Roosevelt 
Administration,  each of whom feared  that any new organization  would fall 
under the influence  of the other.  Here again the spread of default  and 
the drain on the time of both State  Department  officials  and private 
bankers did much to induce  their  accession. 
Like the British Council,  the FBPC liasoned  with the government  and 
enlisted the State  Department in its negotiations.  In  turn,  the State 
Department  sent visitors (Feis  and  William 0. Douglas) to consult with the 
FBPC at its New York office.  Owing to the predilictions  of the Roosevelt 
Administration,  however,  relations  between the FBPC and State  remained 
more distant than those  between the British  Council and the Foreign 
Office.  The Administration  remained  suspicious  that the FBPC  was little 
more than a mouthpiece for the banks.  Compared to sterling  bonds, 
defaults on dollar  bonds  were both numerous and geographically  widespread; 
active  support for the bondholders  would have required  modifications in 
U.S. foreign  policy not just in Central Europe, as was the case for 
Britain, but globally.  Still more influential  was the priority  the 
Roosevelt Administration  attached to trade liberalization. Cordell Hull 
in particular  viewed trade  warfare as both an economic evil and a source 
of diplomatic  tension.  With the  passage of the Reciprocal  Trade 
Agreements  Act  in 1934 the U.S. began to move back toward  freer trade,  in 
part to strengthen  its international  alliances.  Effective  U.S. pressure 
on governments  in default had to involve,  at least  implicitly,  the threat 
of trade sanctions,  which Hull viewed  as incompatable  with broader 
American objectives. 
31 A telling example of government  involvement  took place in connection 
with the 1933  German  standstill.52/  That summer  the German government 
declared  a moratorium  on the foreign transfer  of interest  payments on 
national,  municipal and corporate  bonds.  The Dutch and Swiss threatened 
to impose  trade  sanctions against  Germany,  with whom they ran balance of 
trade  deficits,  The Germans then  settled  with both countries,  whose 
nationals  were to receive full interest  on their Dawes  and Young Plan 
bonds  and 3  1/2 to 4 1/2 per cent on most other  German bonds.  Sweden, 
France  and Belgiwn followed suit.  The British Government  no sooner 
prepared  to ask Parliament  for power to establish  a clearing arrangement 
than a  German financial  delegation  traveled  to London.  Following 
negotiation,  an agreement  was reached  under  which Britain would impose  no 
sanctions  against Germany, in return for which Germany would continue to 
service  Dawes and Young Plan  bonds held by British citizens.53/ That 
arrangement  survived until the outbreak  of World War II. 
The contrast  with the American  response  is striking.  U.S.  officials 
had been  warned by Schacht  that a moratorium was imminent.  Although the 
Roosevelt  Administration expressed  its "shock"  at Germany's  decision,  in 
response  to Schacht's  request for help in opening channels of 
communication  with the bondholders,  the Secretary  of State responded, 
according  to Herbert  Feis,  that "the American  government  could not get 
involved  in these  private  debts. . .  "54/  Despite official  protests, 
American  bondholders  received  nothing.  The contrast  with the experience 
of Germany's  European creditors  drove  home the influence  governments 
exercised over  negotiations  between debtors  and bondholders. 
It was through such  negotiations  that the debt crisis of the l930s 
was ultimately  resolved.  The process was far from  efficient  and painless, 
32 requiring  up to a quarter  of a century  to  complete.  Bolivia,  the first 
country  to  default  in  1931,  was the last to settle  in 1955.  The 
expectations  of the bondholders  and foreign governments  differed  widely, 
and considerable  time  could  be required for their  convergence. 
Each  negotiation  between  bondholders  and foreign  governments  is a 
story  unto itself.  Both sides offered  concessions  as time  dragged  on: 
after having received nothing for years the bondholders  grew increasingly 
willing to accept  any reasonable  offer, while  foreign  governments  grew 
increasingly  anxious  to settle  in  anticipation  of the prospect  of renewed 
international  lending.  The compromises  accepted  by the bondholders' 
representatives  were significant.  Using  Eichengreen  and Werley's  (1988) 
sample  of  foreign  dollar  bonds  issued  in the United  States  in the l920s, 
the spread  between  the ex ante yield  and the internal  rate  of return  (IRR) 
realized  on  these  loans  can be regressed  on the years  elapsed  between 
default  and settlement,  yielding: 
Ex Ante  Yield — IRR = 0.006  + 0.00245 Years  Elapsed  R2 = .68 
(3.22)  (20,65) 
t—statistics  in  parentheses 
The return realized  by the bondholders  relative  to  the contracted  rate 
declines  significantly  with the length  of the period  between  the early 
l930s  and the time  of  settlement,  indicating  how the bondholders  moderated 
their  demands  as the period  progressed.55/ 
Often  a negotiated  solution  required  many years  to  achieve.  That the 
bond market  never recovered  fully  from  the defaults  of the 1930s and that 
large—scale  foreign  lending through  other  channels  only  reappeared  40 
years  after  the iriterwar  defaults  must  be attributed  in large  part to the 
difficulty  of negotiating  cooperative  solutions  to  those  defaults.  It is 
33 not obvious  that creditor—government  intervention  could  have expedited  the 
process.  As described  above,  the British  and American  governments  were 
not adept  in their  use of moral suasion  to influence  the stance  of 
bondholders'  committees.  Had they  been more effective  arm twisters,  it is 
not clear  that it would have been feasible  to induce  the bondholders  to 
accept the same terms  at an earlier  date  The bondholders'  committees 
were engaged  in  a bargaining game with the foreign  governments.  If 
creditor  governments had somehow  compelled  the bondholders  to settle 
earlier  without altering  the behavior  of the debtors at the same time, 
this  would have  weakened the bargaining  position of the creditors  and 
forced  them to settle for less.  Achieving  the same outcome at an earlier 
date through  pressure on the creditors  would have required  matching 
pressure on the debtors,  The obvious  way of accomplishing  this  was by 
increasing  the cost to the debtors of remaining in  default,  which accrued 
in the form  of inability  to borrow.56/ Only by promoting  the reactivation 
of the international  market  could the creditor—country  governments  have 
brought this about.  In a sense,  their  inability  to agree on global  plans 
for restarting lending also impeded the ability of creditor—country 
governments to expedite privately negotiated  solutions  to the crisis, 
3  Conclusion 
Comparing current proposals for achieving  a global  solution  to the 
LDC debt crisis  with their interwar  antecedents  reveals how little is 
novel  or unprecedented  in recent  plans.  Interwar  proposals  for dealing 
globally  with the problem  of defaulted  foreign loans included  schemes to 
swap one liability  for another,  to encourage  creditor—country  banks and 
bondholders  to engage  collectively  in additional  lending,  to lengthen  the 
maturity  structure  of the debt,  to service the debt in local  currency,  and 
34 to establish  an international  fund to lend  to indebted  countries  who 
private markets  would not touch.  Each of these  suggestions  has its 
counterpart  in recent  discussions  of the debt crisis. 
Individuals  currently  advocating  global  solutions  will not be 
heartened  by the failure of the interwar  schemes.  At the same time,  there 
are lessons to be derived  from these  earlier  failures.  First,  bankers 
will actively resist  any plan that limits  their  control over negotiations 
or commits them to a specific course  of action.  Governments  will need to 
be exceptionally  adept in their exercise  of moral  suasion to elicit 
cooperation.  Second,  governments  must be exceptionally  enlightened  to 
recognize the  benefits of global  plans.  As in tariff  negotiations,  the 
benefits of debt  relief  or new money at concessional  terms,  which accrue 
to the creditor  countries  largely in the form  of a more stable  world 
economy, are diffuse relative  to the costs,  be they capital losses  on 
existing loans  or the budgetary  cost of new ones.  Government  officials 
are more inclined  to pursue  other issues  whose payoff  is more apparent. 
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I.  See dine (1987) and Fischer  (1987)  for reviews  and critiques  of the 
alternative  proposals. 
2,  The standard  work on the subject is Moulton and Pasvolsky (1932). 
Recent revisionist  accounts  have offered  a more nuanced  view of the 
American position,  incluencing  the interpretation  I offer  here.  See 
Parrini (1968), Murray (1969) and Wilson (1971).  An account which 
phasizes French  rather  than American intransigence  is Rhodes (1969). 
3.  Leffler  (1972),  pp.586—589. 
4.  The debate  resembles  current discussions  in which even those  with 
sympathy  for the principle  of debt relief find it difficult  to agree who 
is deserving  and to know where to stop once the process  of extending 
relief  has begun. 
5.  Feis (1966),  p,15—16. 
6.  For details,  see Eichengreen  and Fortes (1987). 
7.  Total external  central government  public debt is taken  from United 
Nations (1953),  exports  from League  of Nations (various  years).  A problem 
in constructing  these  ratios  was created by the fact that,  in aggregating 
total foreign—currency  debt and expressing  it in domestic currency,  the UN 
attempted to remove  the impact  on domestic—currency  values  of short—run 
exchange—rate  fluctuations,  therefore  using artificial  exchange rates 
(often  the official  rate  where it differed  from the market  rate)  for the 
conversion into domestic  currency.  I  used these same  artificial  rates to 
convert the debt back into  dollars.  Market rates  were used to express 
exports in dollars.  Because only sovereign  debt is included,  these 
figures differ  from total—foreign—debt—to—export  ratios  like those  in 
Cardoso and Dornbusch  (this volume). 
8.  Eichengreen  and Fortes (1986), p. 612, 
9.  See Eichengreen  (1988). 
10.  Establishing  an international  bank to replace the Dawes  Plan agencies 
was not universally  supported.  See Dulles (1932). 
11.  Dulles (1932), pp. 45—46. 
12.  Henderson seems  to have  been concerned  more  with the global  reserve 
shortage  constraining  moetary reflation  than  with the foreign debt 
crisis.  See Henderson (1932). 
13.  Beyen (1951),  p.51.  There  was disagreesient between  U.S.  and European 
officials  about the scope  of the new bank.  The Europeans,  notably 
Schacht,  urged the creation  of an institution  with ample resources  for use 
in stimulating  long—term  credit flows  and promoting  international  trade. 
The Americans,  George  L.  Harrison of the Federal  Reserve  Bank of New York 
36 prominent  among them,  preferred  a modest institution  that  would 
concentrate  on stabilizing  exchange  rates.  See Costigliola  (1972). 
14.  Clarke (1967), p.179.  In one variant of the plan,  however,  the 
B.I.S,  would be responsible  for appointing  its president  and the majority 
of its directors. 
15.  Cited by Kunz (1987),  p.37.  This passage  was struck  from the 
memorandum  following  its icy reception  at the B.I.S.  For the original 
memo, see National  Archives  RG39,  Box 104,  M.H.  Cochran to  J. Cotton,  11 
February 1931.  The revised  memo can be found in this  same source  and in 
the Lamont  Papers (Baker  Library,  Harvard University),  181—19,  copy of 
proposal, 2 February  1931. 
16.  Lamont  Papers (Baker  Library, Harvard  University),  181—19,  Copy of 
proposal,  2 February  1931. 
17.  Bennett (1962), p.104. 
18.  I am aware  of no conversations  to this effect. 
19.  Clarke (1967), p.178. 
20.  Kunz (1987), p.35. 
21.  Lamont  Papers  (Baker  Library,  Harvard University),  181—19,  N.W.  Jay 
to Thomas  W.  Lamont,  14 February 1931. 
22.  National  Archives  RG39,  Box 104, M.H.  Cochran to  J. Cotton,  11 
February 1931. 
23. Norman letter  to  Harrison,  3 March 1931,  quoted in Clarke (1967), 
p.179. The remainder  of this paragraph  draws  on Clarke,  pp.179—80. 
24.  NA  RG39,  Box  104, M.H.  Cotton  to W.R. Castle,  Jr.,  11 March 1931. 
25.  NA RG39,  Box 104, M.H, Cochran to  J. Cotton, 26 February 1931. 
26.  A proposal to establish  a holding  company,  or investment  trust,  to 
handle foreign  bonds,  to be made up of the three  or four largest 
international  banking houses in New York,  had been circulated  in December 
1930  by Max Winkler of Griscom and Company.  National  Archives  RG39,  Box 
104, M.H. Cochran to J. Cotton,  11 February  1931. 
27.  What follows is from  Beyen  (1951).  Harold James informs  me that  more 
information  can be found in the records of the Reichsbank's  Committee on 
External Debts. 
28.  The difficulties  created  by short—term  credits in 1931 are recounted 
by Eichengreen  and Portes  (1987). 
37 29.  James (1986)  describes  this situation  in detail.  Forbes (1987,  p. 
574) reports  that  in the summer of 1931 as much as I50 million of credit 
was extended to German  banks  and to German  enterprise  by British banks and 
acceptance houses. 
30.  It is conceivable  that the Bank  of England could have bent or broken 
its rules,  as it had  done  on a number  of prior occasions.  See 
Kindleberger (1978), pp.  174 ff.  But there was  the counterargument  that 
doing so would itself  serve to undermine  confidence  in sterling. 
31,  Standstill  Agreements  were also arrangd  with Austria and Hungary, 
the Austrian  Agreement  serving as a model for the German  Standstill.  See 
Forbes (1987). 
32.  Beyen (1951),  p. 62. 
33.  Kindleberger  (1973),  p.211. 
34.  United  States (1933), p.563. 
35.  United States  (1933),  p.571. 
36.  United  States  (1933),  p.530.  In an intriguing  departure  from the 
borrowing—country  line,  the Chilean  representative,  Benjamin  Cohen, 
suggested  that the initiative  fell on Chile to take  measures to restart 
debt service.  Too much of Chile's borrowing  had been squandered  on 
"trivial"  expenditures  such as sending  military  missions  abroad  and 
holding a 100 per cent  gold cover on central  bank liabilities  purely for 
reasons of national  pride.  Although  raising  taxes  or reducing  government 
expenditures  to fund  debt service threatened  to provoke civil  unrest and 
naval mutiny,  Chile had recently reorganized  the Nitrate Sales 
Corporation,  which  marketed one of its principal  exports,  permitting  25 
per cent of its profits to go toward  rehabilitating  Chilean  credit.  If 
the Chilean delegate  to the London  Conference  dramatically  announced  the 
measures that had been taken,  as Cohen proposed,  perhaps other countries 
might  be provoked  to similarly  resume  some  service on their foreign  debts. 
Why the Chilean approach  differed is unclear.  A hint may lie in the fact 
that Cohen's discussions  in Washington  proceeded  from debt to commercial 
policy,  It could  be that the Chileans'  ultimate  concern  was market access 
and that they  viewed  concessions  on debt as a way to secure favorable 
treatment for their  exports.  United  States (1933), pp,518—519. 
37.  United States  (1933), p.561. 
38.  Beyen (1951), p.82. 
39.  Kindleberger  (1973), p.154. 
40.  United  Kingdom  (1932),  p.7. 
41.  The assumption  was  that the U.S. would not expand  its money supply in 
response to gold inflows,  thereby  failing to "recycle"  its gold imports  to 
the rest  of the world. 
38 42.  United  Kingdom (1932), p.S. 
43.  Leith—Ross  (1968),  pp.155—l56.  For obvious  reasons  the satire  never 
made its way into  print. 
44.  Stimson  (1932),  p.3.  The occasion for these suggestions  was Britain's 
decision to extend  preferential  tariff  treatment  to the Dominions  as part 
of the 1932  Ottawa  Agreement.  On the Ottawa  Agreement,  see Cairncross  and 
Eichengreen  (1983),  chapter  3. 
45.  Jenks (1927), pp.288—289.  For details,  see Eichengreen,  Huam and 
Fortes (1987),  from which  the present discussion  draws. 
46.  CFBH Minutes,  Poland,  23/2/37. 
47.  CFBH Minutes,  Brazil,  14/7/38. 
48.  CFBH Minutes,  Greece,  18/7/39. 
49.  The shifts  in America's  external  position  described  here are 
elaborated  upon in Eichengreen  (1987). 
50.  Eichengreen  and Fortes  (1986),  p.622. 
51.  Feis (1966),  pp.266—278. 
52.  This discussion  is taken  from  Eichengreen  and Fortes  (1986), 
pp.619-620. 
53.  Leith—Ross (1968), pp.186—187. 
54.  Feis (1966),  p.141.  The sentence continues,  '. ..but  that perhaps the 
Treasury  or the Federal  Reserve System  might be able to suggest a 
procedure  for arranging  consultation  with the bond  holders." 
55.  A problem with interpreting  this equation  as evidence  of how 
creditors'  demands for compensation  declined  with time is the possibility 
of heterogeneity,  or "sorting,"  on the side of the debtors.  The 
alternative  interpretation  is that the creditors'  demands  for compensation 
on each type of loan  were inelastic  with respect to time,  that  they 
demanded less of countries  perceived  to have less  ability to  pay,  and that 
the countries  with the least  ability to pay were the least  inclined  to 
settle.  In reality,  it is likely  that both effects  were operative. 
56.  There is little  evidence  that an individual  country's  ability to 
borrow in the l940s  and l950s depended on its debt service record  in the 
l930s.  But default in the 'thirties  and delays in settling  thereafter 
interfered  with the ability  of all developing  countries  to borrow 
subsequently.  In other  words,  much of the impact  on creditworthiness  of 
interwar  default took the form of an externality. See Eichengreen  (1987). 
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